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This is Svetlana Bronnikova from the independent media outlet 7x7. From September 18 to 20, Russia held elections to the State Duma, as well as regional elections to local parliaments and city councils. As a result, Russia’s regional parliaments have become even more dominated by United Russia: the ruling party’s average share of seats increased from 71,53% to 78,84%, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and A Just Russia lost dozens of seats, and not a single independent candidate running without party affiliation was elected. We compared the results with those of 2021 and looked at how single-member districts, the removal of opposition candidates, and pressure on public-sector employees affected the new balance of power.

Estimated reading time: 7 minutes

Following the 2026 elections, United Russia, the country’s ruling party, increased its average share of seats across 47 regional parliaments and city councils in regional capitals from 71,53% to 78,84%. The CPRF and A Just Russia lost a significant share of their seats, while not a single independent candidate running without party affiliation was elected. The campaign was accompanied by the removal of entire party lists and individual opposition candidates, as well as reports of pressure on voters and possible inflation of turnout figures.

In 2021, United Russia held less than 75% of the seats in 33 of the parliaments examined. After the 2026 elections, only eight such parliaments remain, and in all of them the ruling party still controls more than half of the seats. United Russia’s lowest result among the parliaments examined was in Vologda Oblast, where it won 53% of the seats.

At the same time, the party did not win 100% of the seats in any of these parliaments. By comparison, after the 2025 elections, Magadan ended up with a city parliament composed entirely of United Russia representatives.

Russian regional parliaments are often elected under a mixed electoral system. Some deputies are elected through party lists: voters cast their ballots for a party, and seats are distributed proportionally based on the results. Others are elected in single-member districts, where the candidate who receives more votes than any of their opponents wins. As a result, a party can end up with a significantly larger share of seats than its share of the party-list vote.

This is what happened, for example, in Lipetsk Oblast. Before the elections, the number of deputies was reduced from 42 to 36, while the number of seats allocated through party lists was cut to nine. The boundaries of the single-member districts were also redrawn. As a result, United Russia increased its representation from 23 to 29 deputies, while the CPRF went from 15 deputies to just three.

Overall, the CPRF lost 41% of its seats in the parliaments examined, falling from 279 to 167. A Just Russia’s representation dropped from 123 to 66 seats. The New People party, founded in 2020, moved in the opposite direction: the number of its deputies increased from 28 to 72. Political scientist Dmitry Loboyko attributed New People’s result to protest voting. Voters who did not want to support United Russia but had no other preferred candidates on the ballot instead cast their votes for New People.

The Communists suffered the biggest losses in the elections because they are “the most dangerous,” Loboyko wrote on his Telegram channel:

“Unlike other parties, the CPRF has at least some kind of ideological platform and its own committed electorate. This is why the Communists remain potentially the most dangerous force for United Russia. This is an institutional issue, not a personal one.”

Opposition Parties Lost Candidates Before Voting Began

The liberal Yabloko party was among those that most frequently faced refusals to register its candidates. It was the only party whose representatives did not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and that ran under the anti-war slogan “For Peace and Freedom!” The party faced problems both in the State Duma elections — to the lower house of Russia’s federal parliament — and in regional campaigns.

In many cases, rival parties challenged the registration of candidates and party lists in court after they had already been nominated or registered. In Karelia and the Pskov, Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, and Tomsk Oblasts, courts cancelled the registration of Yabloko’s regional party lists on various legal grounds.

In Tomsk Oblast, this happened on September 11, just days before voting began. The regional court granted a lawsuit filed by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and removed Yabloko’s list from the regional parliament election.

As a result, Novgorod Oblast was the only region where the party contested the legislative assembly election with a full party list. There, Yabloko cleared the 5% electoral threshold — the minimum share of votes required to participate in the distribution of seats — and won one seat.

Individual candidates were also removed from the elections. Dmitry Rybakov, head of the Yabloko faction in the Petrozavodsk City Council, lost his right to stand for election for one year after facing administrative charges for displaying symbols that Russian authorities classify as extremist.

According to 7x7’s calculations, of the 35 Yabloko candidates who ran in single-member districts in elections at various levels, 18 were removed by courts following lawsuits filed by rivals or election commissions. Another 12 faced administrative charges under the article on displaying extremist symbols, three withdrew from the elections citing pressure, and two were denied registration.

Similar cases also affected Communist candidates. In Omsk Oblast, a court fined Ivan Fedin and Vladimir Vinichenko, an incumbent regional parliament deputy, under the article on displaying extremist symbols. The cases were prompted by posts from 2019 on the Russian social network Odnoklassniki that featured the Facebook/Meta logo.

In 2022, a Russian court declared Meta’s activities extremist. After the administrative rulings entered into force, Fedin and Vinichenko lost their right to stand for election for one year and were unable to participate in the 2026 regional parliament election.

A similar situation arose in Orenburg Oblast, where the CPRF had 12 deputies following the 2021 elections. During the 2026 campaign, some prominent party representatives also lost the right to run after facing administrative charges. Following the election, the Communist faction shrank to just three members.

Public-Sector Employees, Electronic Voting, and Questions About Turnout

Another factor in the campaign was the so-called administrative mobilization. In the Russian political context, this term refers to the practice of systematically encouraging employees of state institutions, the public sector, state-owned enterprises, and large companies to participate in elections.

Reports of such pressure came, among other places, from Altai Krai, where elections to the State Duma and the regional parliament were held simultaneously.

CPRF candidate Maria Prusakova said that employees of public-sector institutions were forced to use remote electronic voting (DEG) and then report back to their management. DEG allows voters to cast their ballots through a state-run online system instead of going to a polling station. According to Prusakova, the management of one outpatient clinic in Barnaul was required to ensure 90% turnout among employees who had registered for electronic voting. At other institutions, employees were allegedly required to send screenshots confirming that they had voted and, in some cases, were told which candidate or party they should support.

Observers and experts also reported that official turnout figures may have been artificially inflated.

In Astrakhan Oblast, where a new regional parliament was elected, turnout increased from 42.5% in 2021 to 55.8% in 2026. Political scientist Denis Leven attributed the increase both to administrative pressure and to the possible inflation of the number of people reported as having voted from home.

The regional election commission rejected these assessments, saying that voting proceeded as normal and that no violations capable of affecting the election results had been recorded.

How the Federal Elections Affected Regional Elections

United Russia won around 350 seats in the State Duma — more than a constitutional majority and more than ever before. The previous record, set in 2016, was 343 seats.

The paradox, political scientist Dmitry Loboyko wrote, is that this record was set by a party whose approval rating, according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), fell to 27.3% in the spring and barely reached 39% a month before the elections. Loboyko argues that the nearly 20-point gap between the polls and the ballot box is a manufactured outcome rather than an electoral miracle.

Regional parliaments and municipal city councils merely reflect the federal trend: the party’s result in a region cannot differ dramatically from its result in the State Duma elections. According to Loboyko, regional legislatures and city councils have effectively become extensions of the executive branch.

“Such figures are needed to create an image of total control, simulate complete unanimity in society, and create the impression that there is no opposition whatsoever,” Loboyko wrote on his Telegram channel. “Usually, this means that the authorities are planning something extraordinary.”

What exactly these plans may involve, and whether they are connected to an expansion of the geographical scope of the war, remains an open question.

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