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This is Maksim Polyakov from the online outlet 7x7. Over the past 25 years, at least 32 governors have faced criminal charges — some while in office, others after leaving it. These cases aren’t just about corruption. They reveal how the system of loyalty and coercion operates within power, how Russia’s political machine functions, and what happens to those who fall out of favor. For anyone aiming to understand how power works in Russia, these are among the clearest — and most alarming — signposts. In this letter, I’ll explain how criminal cases against regional leaders within Putin’s administrative hierarchy have evolved, and what that means for civil society.

Estimated reading time: 12 minutes

Why This Matters

The criminal prosecution of regional officials is part of a repressive system that affects Russia’s civil society. Those charged include both Kremlin-loyal politicians, who may have participated in corrupt schemes for years alongside pro-Kremlin officials and businesspeople, and those who express opposition to federal authority.

Taken together, these prosecutions undermine political engagement among citizens. A stereotype forms: only bribe-takers and corrupt officials involve themselves in politics including opposition. This dampens voters' motivation to take part, and discourages politically inclined individuals from seeking office, because they understand they could be indicted at any moment

However, when a politician who has genuine public support faces criminal charges, part of society often rallies to protect them. In doing so, Russians defend their own right to elect and be elected.

In this piece you’ll discover how political persecution works for both pro-Kremlin and opposition-aligned regional leaders. Understanding who is being prosecuted and why and how shows us the direction in which Russia’s political system is heading, and the spaces that remain for civic participation.

Loyalists vs. Non‑Loyalists

Yevgeny Urlashov ran for mayor of Yaroslavl and, in 2012, successfully won the runoff against the United Russia candidate. At that time, the Kremlin was building its political vertical — appointment of loyalists to mayoral and gubernatorial positions — and Urlashov openly criticized United Russia and expressed plans to run first for the regional legislature, then for governor. Political analyst Alexander Kynev noted that Urlashov’s arrival disrupted the city administration’s neutrality — it stopped cooperating with United Russia — and the mayor had real chances of entering the regional legislature, which reportedly alarmed the Kremlin.

In the early hours of July 3, 2013, officers from the local economic-security division of the Interior Ministry arrested Urlashov on suspicion of extorting a 14 million ruble bribe. Three years later, he was sentenced to 12.5 years in a maximum-security prison and fined 60 million rubles.

This was one of the most high‑profile cases where the Kremlin dealt with a non‑loyal mayor. A similar pattern was used in July 2020, when federal investigators arrested Khabarovsk Krai Governor Sergei Furgal on charges of organizing murders of businessmen. In February 2023, the former governor was sentenced to 22 years in prison.

Political consultant Alexey Aksyutenko described Urlashov and Furgal as examples of politicians who irked those in power — with whom the Kremlin acts "quickly, harshly, and without sentimentality." However, such cases have become rarer. By 2025, the only regional leader with a somewhat oppositional stance was Valentin Konovalov of Khakassia — formally in opposition to the Kremlin — who replaced Putin's appointee Viktor Zimin and, in the 2024 elections, even forced the Kremlin to remove the United Russia candidate, a veteran of the special military operation.

The federal authorities handle disloyal politicians with standard tactics — launching criminal proceedings. Loyal officials face repressive measures too, but often not due to political disagreement with the center.

Since his first term, Vladimir Putin has sought to limit the influence of mayors and governors, recognizing them as political elites with regional power — potentially independent from the Kremlin — even if they fully supported federal policies. In 2004, the Kremlin abolished direct elections for governors for eight years. When elections returned, a municipal filter was introduced — candidates must gather signatures from municipal heads and deputies, most of whom belong to United Russia and typically support their own. Regional leaders were transformed from local powerbrokers into managers of federal projects, even as prosecutions intensified in what Aksyutenko terms a "purge of the regional elite."

This purge caught Komi Republic Governor Vyacheslav Gaizer in 2015 — sentenced to 11 years in a maximum-security colony for corruption — and in 2017, the governors of Mari El (Leonid Markelov) and Udmurtia (Alexander Solovyov), both charged with taking bribes from regional businesses.

"Neither Markelov nor Solovyov had patrons at the federal level," anti‑corruption expert Ilya Shumanov told 7x7. "They originated from the regional elite and had strong support on the ground from local businesses and clans."

Political commentator Andrey Pertsev explained that redistributing regional assets is a common motive for criminal charges against officials. "Often, financial flows are tied to these officials and funneled through friendly businesses," he said. "When such people fall out of favor or weaken, more powerful players become interested in those assets."

To sever governors’ ties with local businesses, the Kremlin introduced "varangians" — outsiders with no prior ties to the regions — by establishing a “School of Governors” at the Russian Presidential Academy (RANEPA) in 2017. Through this, "random" individuals were excluded from governor posts.

"Authorities began selecting people loyal to the Kremlin and connected to federal and financial-industrial groups and clans," Shumanov said. The late governor of Kursk Oblast, Roman Starovoit, trained at the School and was considered a protégé of the Rotenberg brothers, who are close to Putin.

The School changed both the Kremlin’s and governors’ view of the office. The governorship became a mandatory test for advancement to the federal level. "The role of governor strengthened the system of testing an individual’s ability to manage the national economy," Shumanov explained. "First, a politician should work directly with people and their real problems, and only then will the Kremlin consider appointing him to a federal post."

As the Kremlin’s view of the governorship changed, so did accountability. Governors and their deputies began to be prosecuted for failures — failure to complete large federal programs (like building schools or repairing roads). In May 2025, federal agents in Krasnodar Krai detained former deputy governor Alexander Nesterenko on charges of exceeding authority, citing delays in social infrastructure construction under his watch. In Starovoit’s case, the alleged failure was the inability to secure the country’s borders.

In these cases, no mercy is shown — regardless of political connections. Putin emphasized this in May 2024 when he dismissed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, after which the Investigative Committee immediately initiated criminal cases against top Defense Ministry officials. Former deputy minister Timur Ivanov was sentenced to 13 years for large-scale embezzlement and money laundering. Ex-deputy Chief of the General Staff, Vadim Shamarin, received a 7-year sentence for bribes, and Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov — former head of the HR department — was also charged, though his sentence was pending at the time of reporting. Thirteen individuals were arrested in the Defense Ministry case.

Aksyutenko noted: "The story with Shoigu and his subordinates is very telling. Even his strong protection didn’t save him." Shumanov added: "The new reality is starkly different, which is why the Kremlin is placing failure responsibility even on governors — the weakest players in this system. Governors are no longer protected because they no longer ensure political stability in the regions. Now, stability is ensured directly by the Kremlin."

In Russia, Any Politician Can Be Arrested

Corruption is the most common reason why the federal government prosecutes even its loyal regional officials. According to Novaya Gazeta, between 2000 and 2020, governors and mayors were most frequently charged with crimes against state authority: abuse of power, misappropriation of budget funds, bribery (both giving and receiving), document forgery, negligence, and more.

Political consultant Alexey Aksyutenko explains that launching a corruption case is easy. Any official who signs documents is, in one way or another, potentially involved in corrupt schemes. Investigators can interpret such involvement broadly — even the theft of funds by a contractor can implicate a high-ranking official.

“There haven’t been lone wolves in mayoral or gubernatorial offices for a long time — the possibility of a ‘random’ person holding such a post has been entirely eliminated,” says Aksyutenko. “Mayors and governors are always part of a team and act in the interest of that team. From there, the gears begin to turn. Whether it’s labeled as a conflict of interest or as corruption becomes a matter of rhetoric.”

Political commentator Andrey Pertsev adds that corruption charges are the most convenient tool for law enforcement agencies. “They need stats for their reports, and a corruption case can be launched against practically any official.”

According to anti-corruption expert Ilya Shumanov, anti-corruption rhetoric often resonates with the public. “People are happy when someone gets ‘stripped of their wealth,’ because they believe regional authorities are stealing.”

Often, those who testify against governors are people from their inner circle — deputy governors or businesspeople mentioned in the case files. It's likely that former Kursk region governor Alexey Smirnov testified against his former boss Roman Starovoit. Smirnov himself was accused based on statements from a contractor's CEO and a former lawmaker involved in the same scheme.

“This is a typical strategy used by investigators and intelligence operatives,” says Shumanov. “They promise lighter sentences in exchange for cooperation. If multiple people are detained, the authorities usually have already conducted extensive surveillance and have full information. They're ready to act — it's just a matter of political will. There’s always a balance between the necessity of pursuing corruption and the political expediency of doing so.”

The Number of Criminal Cases Is Unlikely to Decline

By 2022, the dismissal of governors in Russia had become a routine process. Political analysts regularly predicted who the Kremlin might remove next. However, after the start of the war in Ukraine, the rate of turnover among governors and regional administrative elites dropped significantly. According to political scientist Alexander Kynev, the federal government found itself disoriented and shifted its focus to more pressing matters such as arms production, military conscription, sanctions, and foreign policy. While the Kremlin used to replace an average of 13 governors per year before 2022, only five were changed between 2022 and 2023.

By 2024, the federal authorities had adapted to the new political reality and resumed managing regional politics. Between July 2024 and June 2025, 13 governors were replaced. According to Kynev, this return to the regular rhythm of dismissals was also influenced by the approaching 2026 State Duma elections, which “always sharply increase the turnover among regional elites.” He also noted that some of the new appointments appear to be a test run for “new, harsher forms of governance.”

One such example is Georgy Filimonov, the new governor of Vologda Oblast. He restricted alcohol sales in the region, advocated for a total ban on abortions, and launched a youth organization called “Oprichniki,” a reference to the brutal enforcers of Ivan the Terrible. Kynev explained that the presidential administration is closely monitoring how political and economic elites — as well as the public — respond to actions by hardline governors like Filimonov.

Since the beginning of the war, criminal prosecutions have become less predictable and are likely to increase. Any failure related to military operations now serves as a red flag signaling deeper issues in the country's governance — and the Kremlin is expected to respond “harshly.”

“If cases like those involving Shoigu’s team or Roman Starovoit continue, soon Russia will face a shortage not only of lower-level municipal administrators but also of personnel in the security services,” said political consultant Alexey Aksyutenko. “No one will want to risk their life and their children’s future.”

Political commentator Andrey Pertsev agrees: “Every official, now as before, understands that they are a potential target.”

In his view, the number of criminal prosecutions against officials will not decline — it will “remain roughly at the same level” because “law enforcement agencies won’t lower their KPIs, and if the number of cases rises, there simply won’t be enough people left to do the work.”