Spoilers Against the Opposition: The Illusion of Competition In May 2014, thousands of residents in Nizhny Novgorod protested against the replacement of a popular local transport operator on route T-71. They supported local entrepreneur Dmitry Kargin, who had built his business from one bus in the late 1990s to 40 buses by 2007, all operating along a route connecting a working-class district to the city center. His services were reliable, affordable, and beloved — buses ran day and night, and fares were the lowest in the city. When the city revoked Kargin’s route license after awarding it to another contractor, he continued operating for free, defying the decision and gaining even more public support. Eventually, the protests and petitions turned political. In 2015, Kargin ran for city council as a Communist Party (CPRF) candidate. Authorities responded by removing him and three other CPRF candidates from the race. Public outcry forced electoral officials to reinstate Kargin — but alongside him on the ballot appeared a full namesake: another Dmitry Valentinovich Kargin. Voters now had to choose between two identically named candidates and a United Russia nominee. In a nearby district, a 24-year-old physical education teacher named Sergey Kargin, unrelated to the entrepreneur, also entered the race. This confusion led to the defeat of the real Kargin. His namesake PE teacher won in the adjacent district, and the United Russia candidate won Kargin’s own. The phenomenon — fake candidates designed to dilute votes — is known in international politics as "spoilers." Spoilers don’t seek office; their goal is to split the vote, especially against strong opposition candidates. In Russia, political technologist Andrei Bogdanov is notorious for using this tactic. He created multiple political parties and fielded spoiler candidates in regional and national elections. These candidates typically lack real campaigns or public support. They exist to confuse and neutralize. Political scientist Dmitry Loboyko explained that this is a deliberate service provided to authorities. Political analyst Stanislav Andreychuk added that spoiler candidates are fully controlled actors with no resources or ideological grounding. At best, they can operate on a municipal level but are easily sidelined when necessary. For most Russians, the term "spoiler" remains unknown. Confusing candidates and parties is common in countries with limited political awareness. As Andreychuk noted, many people only engage with politics during election cycles — and even then, the system is designed to keep their participation minimal.
Decorative Pluralism In 2024, State Duma deputy Maria Prusakova (CPRF, Altai Krai) criticized the new three-day voting system. She previously won her seat in 2021 with over 27% of the vote. But redistricting threatens her chances in 2026: the number of districts in her region is being cut from four to three. Redistricting — redrawing electoral boundaries — is theoretically used to equalize voter representation. In Russia, it happens every ten years. However, in practice, it enables gerrymandering to ensure the right people win. This can involve combining urban areas with surrounding rural zones to weaken urban opposition. Urban voters, often middle class and better educated, are more likely to support opposition candidates. By adding rural districts, where state influence and loyalty are higher, authorities shift the balance. Political technologists then use administrative resources to mobilize rural voters and suppress urban turnout. As Andreychuk explained, redistricting removes political agency from urban voters, helping United Russia maintain dominance. According to him, only about 30 of Russia’s 225 districts are considered genuinely urban — mainly in large cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novosibirsk. These districts are harder to manipulate due to their size and urban density. The current mixed electoral system — half elected via party lists, half via districts — was introduced in 1993. In 2005, the Kremlin shifted to full proportional representation, eliminating district seats to centralize control and weaken regional influence. The mixed system was later reinstated.
Without Oversight In 2023, Alexander Gliskov, a regional LDPR lawmaker, ran for governor in Krasnoyarsk Krai. He claimed United Russia pressured local deputies to withhold signatures required for non-incumbent candidates to get on the ballot. Although Gliskov managed to run and secured over 11% of the vote, he was arrested a month later for allegedly accepting a bribe — a charge he denies. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Party leader Leonid Slutsky suggested the arrest was politically motivated. Such crackdowns on opposition figures — even from tolerated parties — are not uncommon. In 2021, CPRF lawmaker Artem Samsonov from Vladivostok received a 13-year sentence for an obscure misconduct allegation. Both politicians had criticized United Russia. The line between “systemic” and “non-systemic” opposition emerged in the mid-2000s and became popular during the 2011–2012 protests. While systemic opposition is allowed to participate, its influence is tightly controlled. Still, even these parties have political prisoners. Political diversity in Russia exists more in appearance than substance. Occasionally, opposition candidates win due to local popularity or public dissatisfaction — but they remain exceptions. As political scientist Dmitry Loboyko put it, the more mechanisms of control the state invents, the more anxious it becomes. Elections are tightly managed — but not completely predictable.
The Ritual of Voting Sociologist Grigory Yudin describes Russia’s electoral model as a plebiscitary regime. Elections don’t choose leaders — they affirm the existing ruler’s legitimacy. Participation is expected, but outcomes are predetermined. The process becomes a public ritual: voters confirm the tsar’s power. The ritual starts at the top: Kremlin administrators distribute target numbers to governors, who pass them to officials, who in turn pressure public sector workers and business leaders to ensure the expected result. This creates a sense of the system’s omnipotence — and citizens internalize their role as loyal subjects.
Why Vote in Putin’s Russia? Despite the restrictions, political scientists argue that elections still matter. Loboyko points out that even in managed elections, voters can support candidates with similar values. These candidates — sometimes surprisingly — win or influence policy. Moreover, participation preserves civic habits. When unsanctioned candidates eventually appear, an active electorate will be essential. Lastly, voting signals dissent. Even when opposition candidates lose, the authorities notice. High opposition turnout shows discontent and limits the regime’s freedom of action. People who don’t speak up politically become invisible. As Andreychuk summarized: “If you don’t vote, you don’t exist politically.” | 
