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I'm Maxim Polyakov, a correspondent for the online magazine '7x7'.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Orthodox priests have fallen out of favor with the Church. Some openly spoke against the war, while others simply refused to pray for Russia’s victory. As a result, several individuals have been removed from the priesthood, and parishes have plunged into an atmosphere of distrust. Believers, especially the clergy, now face a choice: conform to the system or seek alternatives. In this newsletter, I will discuss how the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has changed since the war in Ukraine began.

Estimated reading time: 9 minutes

Before February 24: How the ROC Sanctified Violence

According to religious scholar Sergey Chapnin, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' exhibits “extreme, even absurd forms of voluntary submission of the Church to the state.” Chapnin believes that the head of the ROC has opened “the darkest chapters in the Orthodox Church’s cooperation with the Putin regime.” Many experts interviewed by “7x7” see Kirill’s 2009 ascension to the patriarchal throne as a pivotal moment in the ROC’s history.

In his first Kremlin speech after being appointed Patriarch, Kirill focused on the relationship between the Church and the state. He proposed the concept of a “symphony,” involving “a harmonious combination of interests” and “a division of responsibilities.” “The state takes care of earthly matters, and the Church cares for the heavenly. You cannot imagine heaven without Earth, nor Earth without heaven. Earth and heaven form the harmony of Divine Being, of Divine Creation,” proclaimed the Patriarch.

“Patriarch Kirill is deeply reverent toward Vladimir Putin. He has referred to Putin as ‘the first Orthodox president’ and has frequently expressed his praises to him directly. Kirill seeks to build close partnerships, citing the 'symphony' concept from Byzantine tradition,” religious scholar and Doctor of Philosophy Sergey Ivanenko explained to “7x7.”

In early 2012, the Pussy Riot band staged a public protest in the form of a punk prayer titled “Mother of God, Chase Putin Away” in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. The band members faced criminal charges of hooliganism and were subsequently sentenced to two years in prison each. “Despite my expectations, the case was pursued and brought to court, and the court slapped them with a two-year sentence... I have nothing to do with it,” Putin commented on the trial.

Representatives of the ROC, including the late Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, former head of the Synodal Department for Church Relations with Society, and Patriarch Kirill, also actively addressed the Pussy Riot case. Archpriest Chaplin described the punk band's performance as blasphemous, while Patriarch Kirill claimed that the protest was offensive to all believers and should not be considered “a form of courage, a valid expression of political dissent, an appropriate action, or an innocent joke.”

For theologian Andrey Kuraev, the Pussy Riot case clearly demonstrated “Patriarch Kirill’s intention to transform the Russian Orthodox Church into a vertical structure that penetrates the public sphere and is ready to persecute anyone who stands in its way.”

In June 2013, the Russian Criminal Code was amended with an article on insulting the feelings of believers. In 2014, this article resulted in the first court verdict: a 24-year-old resident of Izhevsk was sentenced to 200 hours of community service for publishing an image online that allegedly mocked Islam.

Cultural expert Elena Volkova believes that the ROC has successfully replicated the Byzantine model of church-state collaboration: “The state’s increasing sanctification of a culture of violence is endorsed by the Church. It sanctifies both military violence and domestic repression, thereby emphasizing its own significance.”

Moscow Patriarchate Targets Ukrainian Believers and Propagates “Holy War”

The ROC leadership has unequivocally supported Putin and Russia since the war began. “There were just two days of silence in February 2022, followed by clear support for only one side, even though the Patriarch claims to be a spiritual father to both Ukrainians and Russians,” remarks Andrey Kuraev.

Cultural expert Elena Volkova finds the ROC’s stance towards Ukrainian believers predictable and draws a parallel between the Church and the Russian state: “The Kremlin and the Church are like twins. No one cares whether the parishioners belong to them or not; demonization follows a geographical principle. They [the Russian Church and authorities] try to frame this as a spiritual battle, a holy war against the forces of Satan.”

The Moscow Patriarchate’s rhetoric during the war has further intensified the divide between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. As of November 2023, 884 Ukrainian religious communities have transitioned from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) to the newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine since February 24, 2022.

In Russian regions, ROC clergy openly propagate the war. For instance, during a broadcast on Tsargrad TV, Archpriest Andrey Tkachev suggested that Belgorod residents pray more frequently to protect the city from shelling.

In Irkutsk Oblast, Oleg Zyryanov, the rector of the Church of the Image of Edessa in Ust-Kut, urged Russian women to provide more soldiers for the Russian army. He asserted that “wars are won by women” who give birth and raise children, adding, “Who will fight, who will defend our Russian world if there are no births?” according to Lenta.ru.

Mikhail Vasilyev, the rector of the Church of St. Barbara at the Strategic Missile Forces headquarters in Moscow Oblast, made a similar statement in response to a story shared by the hostess of the Spas TV channel. During a broadcast, the journalist mentioned a “family acquaintance” who had supposedly sold almost all her belongings and sent her child to the Canary Islands due to concerns for their safety during the war. Archpriest Vasilyev argued that parting with children would be “less painful and frightening” for a woman with many.  A few days later, he was killed in the war.

How the ROC Gets Rid of “Difficult” Priests

During a liturgy on September 25, 2022, Patriarch Kirill delivered a prayer “For Holy Rus’,”  including the following words addressed to God: “Reinforce the faith of the warriors and all defenders of our Homeland in Your commandments, bless them with spiritual strength, shield them from wounds and capture!”

“There is a bloody prayer for victory that priests who have kept the Gospel’s teachings in their hearts refuse to read. Many have already been defrocked, and many more are awaiting the same fate. I also made my choice — a choice of conscience. Jesus never taught us to kill. To die, yes, but not to kill. What are we even talking about when this is an aggressive war against a once-brotherly people? It is madness,” former ROC priest Nikolay Platonov told “7x7.”

In July 2024, Father Vadim Perminov from Kuibyshev, Novosibirsk Oblast, wrote on his Telegram channel that he had been defrocked, stripped of his right to bless people, and forbidden from wearing a cross after refusing to pray “for victory.”

In his post, Perminov emphasized that he refused to recite the prayer because “it is un-Christian to ask God for victory in a fratricidal war.” He added, “It’s as if Cain were asking God for help as he went to murder his brother Abel.” Despite this, Perminov decided to remain in Russia.

One of the most prominent cases of defrocking for refusing to read the “prayer for victory” involves Alexey Uminsky, a ROC archpriest and the rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity in Khokhly, located in central Moscow. According to media reports, Uminsky’s persecution may have also been linked to anti-war statements he made in an interview with Alexey Venediktov, the former editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow.

After the Diocesan Court’s ruling came into effect, Uminsky appealed to Bartholomew, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, who reinstated him and welcomed him into the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. It was later revealed that Uminsky took part in the Easter liturgy at the Church of Our Lady of the Sign in Paris. When contacted by a “7x7” journalist for comment, Uminsky declined, explaining that he does not give interviews.

Andrey Kuraev, who faced ecclesiastical trials long before the war in Ukraine intensified, believes that “Patriarch Kirill is not someone who tolerates dissent, especially from those who publicly voice their disagreements or directly challenge him, no matter the issue.”

ROC clergy may face punishment not only for refusing to pray “for victory” but also for calling for peace. This was the case with Father Ioann Burdin from the village of Karabanovo in Kostroma Oblast. In June 2023, the Kostroma Diocesan Court removed him from the priesthood. Prior to this, Burdin was fined for “discrediting” the Russian army. In the spring of 2022, he condemned the “fratricide” between Russia and Ukraine and declared his intent to pray for an end to the war.

Former Archdeacon Andrey Kuraev is convinced that the modern ROC won’t necessarily be replaced by “people in cassocks.” “Are you expecting me to say there’s already a Secret Synod? There isn’t one, and there likely never will be. It’s no longer the time when ‘people in cassocks’ have a monopoly on teaching morals,” he elaborated.

Religious scholar and activist Sergey Chapnin is even less optimistic: “There’s no clear solution to the current situation. Many Orthodox believers don’t see it as possible to join smaller non-canonical jurisdictions. These offer more freedom, but they aren’t recognized by other canonical Orthodox Churches in certain territories. No one will create a new underground church, as we all understand the risks, including real threats from the Federal Security Service. It would be impossible to maintain the anonymity of such a collaboration of church communities.”

“Any changes within the Church will only be possible after the fall of Putin's regime,” Chapnin concluded.

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