Hello!

I'm Maxim Polyakov, a correspondent for the online magazine '7x7'.

September 1, 2024, marks the 20th anniversary of the bloodiest terrorist attack in Russian history — the hostage-taking at School No. 1 in Beslan. Since then, Russia has introduced the Day of Solidarity in the Fight Against Terrorism and enacted multiple amendments to the law on counterterrorism. When discussing counterterrorism measures, authorities often highlight actions taken at schools, such as installing metal detectors and prohibiting relatives from entering school grounds, even on September 1, the first day of the academic year. Recently, my colleagues spoke with Alexander Cherkasov, a human rights defender from Memorial. In this newsletter, I will share his perspective on how the Russian state addresses terrorism (or more accurately, how it continually fails in this fight).

Estimated reading time: 7 minutes

How the State Addressed Terrorism Threats In the Past

Between 1991 and 1995, declaring a state of emergency or martial law, which involved the military, required approval from either the upper or lower chamber of parliament.

After the 1995 Budyonnovsk attack, it became clear there was no time to convene parliament when terrorists seized hospitals. This led to the introduction of the counterterrorism operation (CTO) regime, allowing the use of the military without parliamentary oversight. Initially intended for limited, local use, the CTO regime introduced in 1999 covered tens of thousands of square kilometers and remained in place for 10 years, clearly misapplying the law. In this way, the authorities removed what they saw as excessive legal restrictions.

Vladimir Putin’s Role

On August 9, 1999, Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first president, named Vladimir Putin as his successor. According to public opinion polls, Putin initially had a dismal approval rating of just 2%. However, in September, as he spoke about the "counterterrorism operation" and delivered the famous line about “wiping out terrorists in the outhouse,” his popularity grew by 7% each week, soon becoming unassailable.

The Second Chechen War became the key factor in Putin's rise to unchecked power, while the "fight against terrorism" evolved into a tool for governing the country and reshaping it.

When Counterterrorism Became a Tool of Oppression

By making war the top priority on the national agenda, Putin and his team subdued the opposition, eventually securing control over parliament and limiting regional rights under the pretense of saving the country from a non-existent threat of collapse. After taming the political and parliamentary systems, federal media and major businesses were next in line. Citing "counterterrorism measures," Putin gradually curtailed rights and freedoms, both in the early years of his rule and beyond.

Following the 2004 Beslan terrorist attack, new legal amendments abolished direct gubernatorial elections in the regions and altered the formation of the State Duma. These changes had no real connection to terrorism and were merely used as a pretext.

The creation of various elements of Putin’s dictatorship was justified by the need to combat terrorism. However, it's not fair to say that Putin alone is to blame, as terrorism is a real threat. In the 2000s, Russian society found itself caught between the state and terrorism.

How Russia Uses Counterterrorism Legislation

The "fight against terrorism" has become a catch-all justification for nearly anything, from installing cameras at every building entrance and metro station to implementing facial recognition systems that also identify opposition members and potential conscripts. Over the course of 25 years, the state has built an Orwellian system, all under the guise of protecting society from terrorists.

Counterterrorism measures introduced in Russia in 2024 included:

• Schools in Yaroslavl were fenced in, and gates were only opened on a strict schedule, forcing students to climb over the fences to go home. Officials claimed this was part of their efforts to combat terrorism.
• In a Krasnoyarsk school, first-graders were searched for sharp objects.
• The Counterterrorism Commission of Primorsky Krai developed a chatbot for anonymous reporting.
• In a clinic in Ufa, a woman discovered a camera pointed at the gynecological chair. The chief physician explained it was installed to ensure public safety in accordance with the government’s decree "On the Approval of Requirements for Anti-Terrorist Security."
• Yaroslavl schools allowed only one parent to attend the traditional September 1 lineup. The regional Ministry of Education justified this decision by citing "anti-terrorism security requirements."
• Russian schools conduct counterterrorism drills. In a school in the village of Novaya Bryan, Buryatia, a simulated terrorist attack involved three men taking an elderly female security guard hostage, holding a gun to her head, and tying her hands with tape. The "terrorists" scattered anti-personnel mines and entered classrooms where children were present.

These measures, however, are often poorly thought out and ineffective. During the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in the Moscow region on March 22, 2024, more people died from the fire than from gunfire. This occurred because "fighting terrorism" in Russia often means "sealing all the doors." After the next major fire, exits might be unlocked, and after another terrorist attack, they will be locked again. This isn’t a true solution to security threats but merely a reaction to the latest bureaucratic whim.

Why Security Forces Are Helpless Against Real Threats

The bureaucratic system, designed to "fight terrorism" and maintain political stability, ultimately ensures its own survival. If real terrorists are eliminated and this is truthfully reported to higher authorities, the department could be shut down. Since the police are primarily a bureaucratic structure, if no actual terrorists can be found, they will find ways to fabricate cases. They might start investigating old incidents and falsify them, or they might target someone sending money to family in Turkey and accuse them of financing ISIS. Alternatively, they might “solve” cases involving "sleeper agents" of Islamist organizations that real experts haven’t heard of for decades.

This large-scale falsification of work keeps the bureaucratic machine running. However, incidents like the Crocus City Hall attack and the events in Dagestan — where terrorists attacked religious sites and a traffic police station in June 2024 — show that this system is unprepared for real terrorist attacks. There are no individuals capable of making quick decisions or taking responsibility in critical situations.

The attacks at Crocus City Hall and in Dagestan cannot be seen as a "sudden rise in terrorist activity." They are isolated incidents that don’t point to any broader trend, making careful analysis all the more important.

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