Normalization: how repression has become the norm in Russia

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Hello!

I'm Maxim Polyakov, a correspondent for the online magazine '7x7'.

Over the past 20 years, practices such as spying on citizens, repression against activists, media censorship, persecution of the LGBTQ+ community, and other anti-democratic actions have become commonplace in Russia. Normalization is one of the tools that authorities have used to force society to relinquish its rights and freedoms. In this newsletter, I will explain this concept and demonstrate how the government employs normalization.

Estimated reading time: 9 minutes

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How the Unacceptable Becomes Habitual

In 2023, Russian law enforcement initiated 467 politically motivated cases. In total, at least 3,857 individuals are being persecuted for political reasons in the country. Some activists are being sentenced to 20 years in prison. Most of these cases, however, do not gain publicity and do not become topics of discussion among the general public. Russian society has already become accustomed to repression.

Normalization is the process of accepting a new order, where things that used to be unimaginable in everyday life become commonplace and self-evident.

This happens when people convince themselves that what was unacceptable yesterday is now a justified action for the greater good. Societal "norms" are neither good nor bad; they are utilitarian for the state, as new rules automate the government’s control over society. Once the new norm is accepted, people try to adhere to it and prevent actions that do not fit into it.

Since the 2010s, normalization has become a tool of public policy and an important political phenomenon in modern Russia. A vivid example of normalization used by the Kremlin is the destruction of elections as an institution.

Since 2012, authorities have increased the amount of election fraud, exerted pressure on independent observers, and denied registration to independent candidates. The frequency of these actions increased so gradually that a large number of citizens have not even noticed how elections in Russia have turned from a democratic instrument into a totalitarian ritual.

This can be seen in the example of the institution of electoral observation, which has been subjected to legal restrictions since 2002. This process, ongoing since the 2000s, led to multiple limitations during the 2024 presidential election: voters were deprived of video broadcasts from polling stations, independent observers were not allowed to attend, and international observers were not invited for the first time.

Many unlawful decisions, such as media censorship, spying on citizens, repression against opposition members, and persecution of the LGBTQ+ community, first get normalized in the political sphere and then infiltrate everyday life.

Normalization of Censorship

Normalization is impossible without manipulation of information. Authorities may control the narrative by limiting citizens’ access to alternative sources of knowledge and instilling their ideology through state channels. Such actions create a distorted perception of reality, making totalitarian actions seem more acceptable to the public.

The transformation began with the forced sale of independent media. The first such case was the acquisition of NTV, one of Russia's main independent channels, which lasted from 1999 to 2003. In 2001, thousands of people gathered at Pushkin Square in Moscow to express their support for NTV, but they were unable to save the channel. In 2020, when Vedomosti, one of Russia's key independent business newspapers, was sold to the pro-government media holding FederalPress, the mass audience barely noticed. Many Russian media outlets have gradually come under the control of people affiliated with the authorities. Subsequently, they started discreetly propagating the government’s decisions, causing readers to accept these changes as a given. Media branding and tone of voice often remain the same after the purchase, so the audience does not notice the shift in ownership and editorial policies.

Sociologist Grigory Yudin compares these processes to the "Salami slicing" tactic:

“This tactic presupposes that you achieve your goal not directly but through a series of intermediate actions, slowly ‘cutting’ it like salami. If you tell your audience that in one year X will turn into Y, it will cause turmoil and a strong reaction. But if you introduce changes gradually, it will go unnoticed. You need to cut 1/40th of X each time, where 40 Xs equal Y, so that in one year you reach Y. The audience will not object. Putin currently applies this technique of slow and smooth changes.”

The siege of the media sphere continued with blocking of informational resources. In 2022, the government restricted access to the websites of dozens of media outlets, including Yekaterinburg's It’s My City, Caucasian Knot, Sakhalin.Info, and many others. Another step toward limiting freedoms was the blocking of internet platforms beyond media outlets. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter were blocked in Russia.

In February 2023, Instagram's audience dropped fivefold, and Facebook's by 3.5 times compared to February 2022. Meanwhile, Telegram's reach increased by 1.8 times, VK by 1.15 times, and Odnoklassniki by 1.12 times. To access Instagram in Russia, one must download a VPN service and turn it on each time. Such services often work intermittently or come at a cost, prompting people to migrate to unblocked platforms, many of which cooperate with the government. Consequently, the state gains secret access to conversations and personal data of thousands of people. The shift to Russian internet resources has accelerated the normalization of the state's pervasive surveillance over its citizens.

The blockings were followed by legal measures. When Meduza became one of the first media outlets recognized as a foreign agent, it sparked shock. Since then, most independent media have been labeled as foreign agents, and the Ministry of Justice has begun including individual journalists, activists, and politicians in their registry. The agency traditionally announces new additions to the list on Fridays. By the end of 2024, 800 individuals and organizations had been recognized as foreign agents. This status no longer elicits strong emotions among citizens and is often joked about, even considered a “sign of quality,” contributing to the normalization of this practice.

Normalization of Surveillance

One million surveillance cameras are installed across Russia, with one third linked to facial recognition systems. Technology originally intended for public security has transformed into a tool for mass surveillance and control.

The integration of artificial intelligence into surveillance began in Moscow in 2020. AI was used to recognize faces in metro stations, scan car license plates, measure temperatures in crowded areas, automate social benefit provision, and calculate the “self-isolation index” using data from internet services and GPS navigators.

Authorities claimed that these actions were in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 24, 2020, Russia adopted Law No. 123-FZ, marking the start of a five-year experiment to introduce a special legal regime aimed at enhancing the development and implementation of AI technologies in Moscow.

"We witnessed an example of slow and gradual changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Information Technologies in Moscow created a social monitoring app, initially presented as a testing tool to monitor quarantine compliance in the capital. However, within just one month, they launched the app in 'battle mode,' with all functions activated and without any prior testing," shared a developer of a face recognition algorithm, who preferred to remain anonymous.

Security forces have gradually begun using cameras equipped with facial recognition to monitor activists. By July 2023, we had learned about 595 opposition members detained with the aid of AI video surveillance. Cameras with facial recognition are installed across the country; at least 62 regions began using this system, which was implemented between 2021 and 2023.

By 2024, video surveillance had become integrated into everyday life and is no longer perceived as something exceptional. The government began dividing single technologies into separate tools as another method to normalize their actions.

"Technologies might be merged into a single object, as seen with cameras and facial recognition algorithms. Alternatively, they can be divided, allowing people to perceive a camera sensor, a facial recognition algorithm, and the ability to pay using facial data as distinct entities, rather than viewing them as integral phenomena," explained sociologist Viktor Vakhstein.

"The issue in modern Russia is the lack of alternative political imagination. How else can we apprehend criminals if not with surveillance cameras? People argue that placing cameras everywhere is beneficial because it aids in combating crime, and this belief begins to influence normativity. The idea of taking proactive measures to prevent criminals from emerging in the first place does not occur to us due to the absence of collective self-regulation. For instance, who in Russia can be convinced that crime rates could be reduced through solidarity rather than surveillance?" asks sociologist Grigory Yudin. 

Normalization of Indifference

The ultimate goal of normalizing repressive and anti-democratic practices is the depoliticization of citizens. The government aims for people to lose interest in politics, not perceive it as an integral part of their lives, and certainly not to participate in political processes. The onset of full-scale war in Ukraine was a political decision, and such actions cannot be considered a continuation of everyday life in Russia.

"Let's not politicize this issue," activists in Shiyes, Yekaterinburg, Khimki, Khabarovsk, and Bashkortostan heard from the authorities. This ritual phrase suggests that state structures should focus solely on everyday economic activities, and any shortcomings can be addressed in the course of normal work. Those in power seek to alter citizens' perspectives on certain events.

An example of this approach is evident in the speech delivered by Radiy Khabirov, the head of Bashkortostan, on January 31, 2024: "They [local residents] have direct complaints about the violation of legislation by certain mining companies, to put it mildly. In fact, these companies are engaged in barbaric extraction of our mineral resources. The local residents are strongly opposed to this, and so are we." In late January, residents of Bashkortostan protested against the pressure on environmental activists and the court verdict handed down to one of them, Fail Alsynov. In this quote, the actions of the authorities are justified by stating that the administration opposes mining in the republic as much as the local residents do. Khabirov ritually agrees with the locals, but he addresses a less common issue, namely the conflict between residents of the Uchalinsky District and gold mining companies.

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Focus is a short summary of the main articles published by '7x7' over the past week and my personal take on them. By reading this newsletter, you'll get a unique insight into the prevailing trends in Russian society today.

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