Outlines of Putin’s fifth presidential term from the Russian regions’ perspective

Архив рассылок
header_focus

Hello!

I'm Maxim Polyakov, a correspondent for the online magazine ‘7x7’.

Vladimir Putin’s inauguration is scheduled for May 7, 2024. This will be his fifth official presidential term. It seems that there has not been any significant changes in Russia during the past few months, however, this is just an illusion. In fact, many social and political processes in the country have accelerated. In this newsletter, I will delve into these shifts and offer several illustrative examples, all occurring within the past week. This will help you better understand the atmosphere surrounding Putin’s new ascension to the presidency. 

Estimated reading time: 7 minutes

Subscribe
Donate

Increased Level of Violence

Since the onset of the war, experts predicted a growth in violence in the country, and it has indeed happened. Often, crimes are committed by former war participants, contracted military personnel, and members of private military companies. Comprehensive statistics on such crimes are lacking, but our colleagues from the ‘Verstka’ media outlet counted at least 100 murders and another 100 cases of serious injuries inflicted by men who had returned from the war zone. These are just instances that drew attention of regional media outlets or appeared in the police and prosecutors’ reports. In reality, their number might be several times larger. Here are a few recent cases:

  • A resident of Ivanovo, who participated in the war in Ukraine, attacked a 15-year-old boy and used a pistol to threaten him with murder over a pin with a peace sign. ‘Do you actually support Russia? Are you against the war? […] Do you wanna die? You are a bitch. You have this anti-war sign, and soon, we are going to f*** you all. […] Join the army, bitch, for Russia, for f****** Ivanovo.’ The attacker’s ex-wife fruitlessly urged his detention for over a year. She filed about 30 complaints with the police due to constant threats and stalking.
  • Another war participant is currently standing trial in Saratov. During his ‘leave,’ he returned to his hometown and delivered a speech about the war in Ukraine to schoolchildren. On the same day, he physically assaulted his neighbor, the neighbor’s wife, and the police officers who arrived on the call. The victims are afraid that the attacker will go to war again without any punishment.

The situation with members of private military companies is even worse. Many of them were convicted for murder and other serious crimes but were pardoned after participating in the war. After 6 months of military service, these people frequently return to their hometowns and villages and resume killing, maiming, and robbing other residents. When this happens, locals are afraid to leave their houses, as they feel helpless. They see that the military are protected by an unwritten law. The police avoid dealing with ex-convicts turned soldiers, as the Ministry of Defense considers them heroes who ‘atoned for their sins on the battlefields.’

Journalists have analyzed 134 verdicts in such cases. In ⅔ of them, the court considered participation in the war as a mitigating circumstance and did not impose the maximum punitive measure.

More Contracted Personnel

Men from small villages and poor Russian regions keep signing contracts with the Ministry of Defense and are deployed to Ukraine. For many, the remuneration offered for participation in the war is several times bigger than their potential salary. The war has become the primary social elevator for residents of poor regions, though not everyone eventually receives their payment. 

  • An 18-year-old boy from Taseyevo village in Siberia, which only has 6,000 inhabitants, has gone to war. The residents, including the village head, Konstantin Dizendorf, came to see him off. Dizendorf treated the boy in a fatherly manner and called him Sasha, an endearing form of the name Alexander. “I told him: perhaps this is not such a good plan, maybe you should first undergo compulsory military service, and then sign a contract. He replied, ‘No, this idea has been growing inside me for a long time, I want to sign a contract, as there is nothing to do in Taseyevo, there are no jobs.’ Perhaps, he is right."
  • Over 110 war participants from Samara Oblast complained about manipulation with gubernatorial payouts. Each signed a contract specifying a one-time payment of 15,000 EUR. However, before being sent to the war zone, they were given new contracts without the payout addendum. The military tried to protest, but to no avail.

Intensified Pressure on Public Institutions

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the state continued to dismantle public institutions, increase pressure on activists, and label any undesirable journalists, scientists, politicians, and public figures as foreign agents. These processes are ongoing, and experts predict a new wave of repression following the inauguration. Here are a few recent examples:

  • The Arkhangelsk ecological movement ‘Pomorye Is Not a Dump’ ceased its activities. This is, perhaps, one of the best-known Russian protest movements in the last 6 years. It appeared in Arkhangelsk Oblast in 2018 after the authorities announced the construction of an enormous landfill in the north of Russia to dispose of garbage delivered from Moscow. Local residents united and started holding protests across the region. Two years later, the authorities abandoned the construction plan due to the activists’ pressure. This week, one of the movement’s creators, Dmitry Sekushin, told ‘7x7’ that they decided not to put their allies at risk. ‘The state arbitrarily considers any groups of citizens as organizations and labels them as extremists and terrorists. This has happened to the Anti-Corruption Foundation* and the LGBTQ+ community. Maybe at some point we will resume our fight for the clean North, but right now, it is extremely dangerous.’
  • In 2022, a regional parliament deputy was recognized as a foreign agent for the first time. The affected oppositionist’s name is Victor Vorobyov, and he was the head of the CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) faction in the State Council of the Komi Republic. Vorobyov faced discrimination after being included in the foreign agent register: he was often not allowed to speak during parliamentary sessions, and his speeches were cut from live broadcasts. Recently, the deputy announced his resignation as the faction head. This is, in fact, the only way to enable other CPRF members to work normally and receive necessary information in parliament.

Lost Sense of Security

Victory Day, celebrated on May 9, remains the most important national holiday for many Russians. However, several Russian regions have already canceled habitual military parades. This is especially relevant for border areas and places of dislocation of large military units. Authorities fear that parade participants – hundreds, sometimes even thousands of military – will be a convenient target for the Ukrainian army. Here are a few other indicators of the loss of security felt by Russians:

  • Apart from the parades, authorities have canceled the already traditional ‘Immortal Regiment’ march. This event was invented a few years ago by Tomsk journalists of the independent TV2 channel. They suggested citizens take to the streets on May 9 with portraits of their relatives who fought in World War II. The ‘Immortal Regiment’ soon became extremely popular, and the state decided to take over its organization, turning it into a nationwide event and making participation obligatory. This year’s march has been canceled not only for safety reasons but also due to political concerns. Officials are afraid that the relatives of those who have died in Ukraine during the past two years will come to the parade with portraits, revealing the real number of the deceased, which is unacceptable for the state.
  • Basements of residential buildings in Kazan started being labeled as ‘shelters.’ The city is located over 1000 km away from Ukraine. According to officials, all basements capable of accommodating people during shelling will receive this marking. In March 2023, it became evident that only 4% of Tatarstan's population would be able to hide in specially equipped shelters; the rest would have to use basements, which often do not have sufficient shelling protection. On April 2, Tatarstan sustained the first drone attack since the beginning of the war. UAVs targeted the special economic zone ‘Alabuga’ and the TANECO oil refining complex in Nizhnekamsk. Seven individuals were injured in the attack.

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of trends accompanying Putin’s fifth presidential term. Legal nihilism, distrust towards state institutions, credulity towards propaganda, and general disunity are also notable issues. Stay tuned for our further newsletters to learn more about them.

Subscribe

Focus is a short summary of the main articles published by '7x7' over the past week and my personal take on them. By reading this newsletter, you'll get a unique insight into the prevailing trends in Russian society today.

Subscribe to Focus and tell your friends and family about it!

© Copyright, online journal "7х7"

Unsubscribe

Отправлено через

SendPulse